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Book Reviews
Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy. New
York: Basic Books, 1994. Pp. x + 308.
StephenJ. Adler, The Juyy: Trial and Errorin the American Courtroom. NewYork:
Random House, 1994. Pp. xvi + 285.
Reviewed by Susan Bandes
There is an almost mystical quality to the belief in the jury system. Jeffrey
Abramson and Stephen Adler confront serious limitations and contradictions
in its workings, and despite those limitations each reaffirms his faith in the
institution. Their recent books-both brimming with history, empirical data,
legal analysis, and anecdote-might at first appear anything but mystical. Yet
for all their efforts to trace origins, to quantify results, to understand, and to
fix what is broken, neither book can really explain why we should agree to
preserve the system despite its flaws. Belief in the jury system seems to require,
ultimately, a leap of faith.
A leap of faith may be necessary, for example, to explain why Adler believes
juries should go on deciding complex cases in specialized areas despite his
convincing demonstration of their inability to do so in at least one complex
antitrust case, or why Abramson believes juries should be entrusted with
criminal cases that could lead to long prison sentences, despite his convincing
argument that they should not decide capital cases.
We are all, these days, experts on the unpredictability of juries. We've
witnessed the Rodney King verdict, the Menendez hung jury, Marion Barry's
acquittal, and, as I write this, the speedy acquittal of 0. J. Simpson. Yet our
faith in the system persists, even as our puzzlement and fascination increase.
Adler's and Abramson's books cannot resolve the contradiction between this
faith and the frequent unworthiness of its object. But their explorations are
insightful and illuminating.
Despite some overlap in coverage, the books differ substantially in their
approach and in their goals. Even on the issues that both authors discuss
(such as the use ofjury consultants, and the ability ofjuries to pass sentence in
capital cases), their approaches, as well as their analyses, often diverge sharply.
Despite these differences, comparison of the books-on the same topic,
released in the same year-is unavoidable. Although each book has much to
recommend it, Abramson's is by far the more satisfying.
Abramson aims high, and in nearly every respect he succeeds. His greatest
achievement is writing a book which promises to be accessible to nonlawyers
Susan Bandes is Professor of Law at DePaul University and Visiting Professor of Law at
Northwestern University.
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but is filled with new insights and information for more knowledgeable
readers as well. Although some reviewers have called the book challenging, it
is a challenge well worth undertaking. Adler's book is much less demanding.
For the lawyer or legal academic familiar with the field, it too frequently
oversimplifies complex issues. Even for the nonlegal reader, it may seem thin
in comparison to Abramson's rich and nuanced study.
Abramson's theme is nothing less than the jury's role in a democracy. He
sees this role as conforming to two possible models. The representational
model, which he finds disturbingly ascendant, holds thatjuries perform their
democratic function by representing the various constituencies whose claims
they must adjudicate. That is, not only arejuries made up of people of diverse
backgrounds, but each juror will hold fast to the perspective of the group she
represents. Democracy is achieved by ensuring that the various perspectives
are represented, and counterbalance one another. The deliberative model,
which he champions, holds that although each juror brings her particular
outlook to the jury room, the verdict will be reached through a process of
open-minded debate and persuasion which will transcend initial partialities.
He then examines three major aspects of the jury's role: the type of
knowledge it is expected to possess, the meaning of the notion of representativeness in the makeup of thejury, and the nature of deliberation on a verdict.
He argues that, as to each aspect, the deliberative ideal has been eclipsed by
the undesirable representational model.
Particularly after the debacle of searching for jurors who knew nothing
about 0. J. Simpson, Oliver North (Abramson, page 49), or Imelda Marcos
(Adler, 48), Abramson's treatment of the first topic-jurors' knowledge-is
not merely timely, but scathing. Abramson uses a rich variety of historical
sources to demonstrate that the current search forjurors unaware of the most
highly visible persons and events of the day is not firmly grounded in history.
As he shows, the battle over the appropriate scope ofjurors' knowledge had
implications for the question of vicinage (the area from which jurors may be
drawn); the question whether jurors should be law-finders as well as factfinders; and the question of how impartiality ought to be defined.
It is well known that in colonial times juries were locally based and selfinforming: they based their decisions, in part, on their personal knowledge of
the events and people in question. In Abramson's nuanced version, we learn
that even in colonial times the local character of juries was a conscious
rejection of the Federalist position, which opposed local juries and favored
jurors unacquainted with the persons or incidents of the trial (Abramson, 2526). We further learn that, well into the nineteenth century, jurors with
knowledge of the persons and incidents were acceptable unless there was
reason to think they had prejudged the merits of the controversy. The current
practice of demanding ignorance, which Abramson says "naively defines an
impartial mind as an empty mind," is of relatively recent vintage. Abramson
concludes that the ban on local knowledge "stands history on its headdisqualifyingjurors for having precisely the acquaintances or information that
once qualified them to judge their community's events in context" (37).
Abramson's indictment of enforced ignorance is so powerful in part be-
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cause he appreciates the complexity of the issues. Although his own position
on ignorantjurors is forcefully stated, he supplies the material for those who
would debate him. He explains that the original preference for local juries
with firsthand knowledge was not based primarily on the superior fact-finding
abilities of suchjuries. Rather, it was based on an anti-Federalist belief in local
people representing local values (29). Such familiar cases as the trials ofJohn
Peter Zenger and William Penn illustrate the democratic underpinnings of
this belief-that the local jury can act as a bulwark again the imposition of
repugnant or arbitrarily imposed foreign values.
Even in colonial times, there was an inherent irony in this democratic
notion, for jury service was available only to white male property owners, and
indeed only to a small percentage of them (29).' Abramson concedes that the
anti-Federalists did not appear to object to prevailing restrictions on jury
service. More relevant to current concerns, however, is the fact that it has
become infinitely more complicated to speak of local values, local concerns,
or local justice. Even to the extent that one can speak of localities' possessing
homogeneous values, the modem ideals of uniform national rights and equal
protection pose a challenge to the legitimacy of local justice. The vision of
John Peter Zenger is counterpoised against the vision of an all-white jury in
the Simi Valley vindicating the values of the white middle-class law enforcement officials who reside there in large numbers.
Abramson is well aware of the tensions, as is evident in his discussion ofjury
nullification. He begins by documenting the jury's loss of the power to decide
questions of law. He recognizes that the law-deciding power raised the risk of
uncertainty, local prejudice, and parochialism. Yet he notes thatjuries' exercise of the law-deciding power furthered democratic participation in a number of positive ways. Such juries shielded liberty against tyranny, brought
enforcement into harmony with local values, and expressed the conscience of
their community (87).
Abramson seems to concede that many of the conditions which made the
law-deciding power possible no longer exist. First, the law is no longer "transparent." The law itself has become more complex; in addition, we no longer
believe that law springs from natural reason and thus is accessible to all
people. Second (and also connected to the move from natural law), communities even by the nineteenth century had become more heterogeneous, and
less likely to share moral values which could be confidently translated into
legal judgments.
Nevertheless, Abramson staunchly defends the power ofjury nullification
and argues for extending the power by informing jurors that it exists. He
emphasizes that, unlike the general law-deciding power, the power of nullification cannot result in an unjust conviction in a criminal case. Even so, as he
recognizes, it can work substantial injustice, as in the longstanding refusal of
all-white Southernjuries to convict whites accused of murdering blacks or civil
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rights workers of any race (60), and in the acquittal in state court of the police
officers who beat Rodney King. In short, prejudice, parochialism, and uncertain application of the law are real dangers of nullification. Abramson accuses
opponents of nullification of "collapsed faith in the virtue of jurors" (93).
Here is an example of the author's own leap of faith, and his request that we
take the leap with him.
Abramson's discussion of jury selection and the cross-sectional ideal is
among the most fully developed sections in the book. In this section, which is
crucial to his argument, Abramson illustrates quite effectively the tension
between the representational and deliberative models. He describes the deliberative ideal as "to draw jurors together in a conversation that, although
animated by different perspectives, still [strives] to practice ajustice common
to all perspectives" (127). He describes the representational model as a cynic's
view ofjuries, "in which there was not one justice for juries to represent but
multiple justices reducible to whom a juror happened to be by race, sex,
national origin, religion, occupation, income, educational level, and on and
on" (124). His view is not simplistic; he recognizes that each juror's perspective will be informed by her particular situation, and thatjurors are not "pure
pieces of disembodied reason" (141). He argues quite reasonably that, even
so,jurors ought to be able to learn from one another and from the evidence.
Nevertheless in some respects he does oversimplify. He seems to disdain
the importance of the appearance of justice. He rejects the idea that a jury
representing a cross-section of the community may be appropriatelyreassuring
to the community itself, by assuring it that it has not been disenfranchised.
Concern for the appearance ofjustice need not make the cross-sectional ideal
nakedly political, as he seems to suggest.
The most difficult of Abramson's positions to reconcile is set forth in his
last chapter, "Race and the Death Penalty." Here is a situation in which, as he
notes, the jury is still permitted to operate as the conscience of the community. At least in theory, thejury may always show mercy and refuse to sentence
the defendant to death, regardless of the nature of the crime or the aggravating factors.2 Abramson provides a powerful discussion of the Baldus studies,
which demonstrated that the race of the defendant, and especially the race of
the victim, are significant factors in whether the jury will impose the death
penalty.3 He observes, correctly, that the jury's failure to act in a colorblind
manner is unsurprising, given larger social failures at colorblindness. He
recommends that capital sentencing decisions be taken from juries and given
to judges (239).
I found this conclusionjarring in light of the rest of the book. As Abramson
surely recognizes, racial prejudice is unlikely to infect only capital sentencing
deliberations. Itwill likely affect deliberations in the civil rights cases for which
he supports the power ofjury nullification. It will likely affect deliberations in
all criminal cases, including those in which the defendant can be sentenced to

2.
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E.g., David C. Baldus et al., Equal justice and the Death Penalty (Boston, 1989).
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life imprisonment. Although the argument can be made that death is different, and that the risks are simply not worth taking when the decision is
irrevocable, Abramson's conclusion nevertheless seems to call into doubt his
unquestioning faith in the virtue ofjurors. We are back to the leap of faith.
Just as it cannot be explained, neither can its limitations.
My reservations about Abramson's treatment of various issues did not
detract from my admiration and enjoyment of his book. The book is provocative, and it is also generous. Abramson is not content merely to argue his case.
He wants to enlighten us, even at the risk of exposing the inevitable loose ends
in his own thesis. I was consistently educated, engaged, and challenged.
Stephen Adler's book confronts the dissonance between the idealized jury
we hope for and the flawed juries (and jury proceedings) with which we live.
The book is divided into three parts: "The Vision," "The Disappointment,"
and "The Hope." These sections set out, respectively, a description of ajury
functioning properly, a series of descriptions of cases-some high profile,
some not-in which the jury system failed, and a list of suggested means of
reforming the jury system.
Most of Part I tells a detailed story about the trial and sentencing hearing of
a young man, Mark Robertson, who had been charged with the capital crime
of double murder. This section illustrates many of the strengths and weaknesses of the book.
Ever since the U.S. attorney censured the University of ChicagoJury Project
for nonconsensual eavesdropping on jury deliberations (Abramson, 196),
there has been the problem of access. Adler's method of repeatedly interviewing jurors and piecing together their responses and trial testimony into a
narrative works very well. It succeeds in producing a series of detailed, very
readable stories about what occurred in thejury room. In each case the access
to jury deliberations was illuminating-a concrete and accessible means of
illustrating the author's concerns about the jury.
In the Mark Robertson case, we are permitted to listen in on deliberations
during both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Adler
chose the trial to illustrate a case in which the system worked, and it serves this
purpose admirably. Thejury understands its different roles in the two phases,
and in each phase is deliberative in the best sense. All the jurors well appreciate the enormity of the decision they are called upon to make. Each juror
thoughtfully sifts through the evidence and considers the opinions of the
otherjurors. The verdicts seem well supported by the evidence. Moreover, the
jury arrives at the death sentence after due consideration of the quality of
mercy, although it ultimately decides that mercy is not appropriate in the
particular case.
Nonetheless, the vignette is unsatisfying in a couple of respects. One small
respect, which I mention because it recurs throughout the book, is its tendency to oversimplif3; the law in ways which border on misstatement. Adler
mentions, with seeming approval, that the practice of "death qualifying
juries steers a middle ground by letting juries reflect their communities'
diverse viewpoints on capital punishment without standing in the way of
all executions" (11).
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I searched in vain for even an endnote mentioning that death-qualified
juries tend to be more likely to convict at the guilt phase,4 or that the
Withrspoor!P decision was in any way controversial. Likewise, although the
jurors focus during the sentencing phase on their fears that the defendant will
be released and cause more harm (35), Adler never mentions the legal debate
that culminated in Simmons v. South Carolina.6 Simmons held that where the
prosecutor has argued that the defendant's dangerousness should lead to his
execution, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that another possible
sentence is life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.
Adler has obviously attempted to pitch his book to a lay audience, which
makes it a sometimes frustrating read for lawyers. But as the Abramson book
illustrates, it is possible to succeed with both legal and lay audiences by
apprising them of the complexity and contradiction inherent in an issue,
rather than merely stating the bottom-line conclusion.
The larger respect in which the description of the Robertson trial is unsatisfying is in its failure to deal with the issue of race. Adler devotes two sentences
to the issue, noting that opponents of capital punishment argue that the
system is racially biased, and that these opponents are calling for abolition of
the death penalty, not replacement ofjuries withjudges. (Ironically, replacing
juries with judges in capital sentencing proceedings is exactly what Abramson
does favor.) Here, as with many of the issues both books discuss (compare the
discussions on scientific jury selection and peremptory challenges), Adler's
book suffers by comparison.
In the wake of the Simpson verdict, if not before it, it seems impossible not
to discuss race. In describing the smooth functioning of the Robertson jury,
Adler never discloses the race of jurors, victims, or defendant. Perhaps he
believes that race ought to be irrelevant to his point, but in light of the Baldus
studies it is difficult to glean larger lessons from the vignette without giving
some thought to whether racial variables affected the dynamics he describes.
Part II of Adler's book is tremendously enjoyable. It tells five stories ofjury
deliberations in a variety of cases: the high-profile Imelda Marcos case, a
complex antitrust case, a personal injury case, a murder case, and a case in
which principles of scientificjury selection were used. I found the description
of the antitrust case, a suit by Liggett & Myers against Brown & Williamson for
anticompetitive practices in the cigarette industry, to be especially effective.
Here was ajury operating in good faith and undergoing personal hardship
(the trial took eight months), but given none of the tools it needed to
understand the difficult concepts that would enable it to passjudgment. This
chapter is Adler's most effective argument for his subsequent proposals
for reform.

4.
5.
6.

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 193-203 (1986) (Marshall,j., dissenting).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too
Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1019, 1026-31 (1987).
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994). The Supreme Court decision in Simmoav itself may have come down
after the book went to press, but the issue was hotly debated in the lower courts.

120

Journalof Legal Education

The proposals themselves, set forth in Part III, are sensible, pragmatic,
mostly unobjectionable, and something of a letdown. The proposals to pay
more attention to the dignity and comfort of the jurors are laudable-and
remind us how rarely the well-being of the jurors is the focus when we discuss
reform. The proposals to present jury instructions early and in understandable language and to allowjuror note-taking are eminently sensible. Yet given
the success of the book's major section in convincing us that there are serious
problems with the jury system, these reforms look like tinkering at the margins. Adler's more powerful suggestion is to reform the composition ofjuries,
by eliminating peremptory challenges and most exemptions. His arguments
for these two reforms are well supported, and he makes a convincing case that
they could improve the quality ofjustice considerably.
Ultimately, the disappointment Adler describes stays with us as the hope
fades. Like Abramson, he cannot explain his ongoing faith in the jury system.
However the reader comes out on this question, the immediacy and freshness
of Adler's vignettes, and the richness of Abramson's historical analysis, enable
us to think about our own vision of the jury in a new light.

Gregory Howard Williams, Life on the ColorLine: The True Story of a White Boy
Who DiscoveredHe Was Black. New York: Dutton, 1995. Pp. xiv + 285.
Reviewed by Martha Chamallas and Peter M. Shane
In 1954, at the age of ten, Greg Williams took an unforgettable journey to
Muncie, Indiana. Until that time, Greg and his younger brother Mike had
lived in Virginia as white children. Their mother was white, and their father
(then called Tony, later Buster) told everyone that he was Italian. But when
the marriage broke up and Tony's financial ventures failed, he pushed Greg's
life over the color line. He moved the boys to the black section of Muncie,
where he had been raised. "In Virginia you were white boys," he told Greg and
Mike. "In Indiana you're going to be colored boys" (page 33).
Life on the ColorLineis Greg Williams's compelling memoir of his childhood
and adolescence. On one level, the story is an intensely personal account of a
young boy's discovery of himself and of a son's coming to terms with his
father. At another level, the book is a slice of American social history during
the '50s and '60s, a documentary of the cruelties inflicted by racial hierarchy.
Most profoundly, the memoir is a meditation on the social construction of
identity, exploring the complexity of the meaning of race and racial identity.
Gregory Howard Williams, now the dean of the Ohio State University
College of Law, was our colleague on the University of Iowa law faculty for
twelve years. One of the first observations white people often make about Greg
is that although he looks white, he is "really" black. It now seems startling to us
that, over the years, we never understood how revealing that description was
of Greg's identity. At Iowa, Greg's blackness was shown by his actions, interests, and affiliations. When he was director of admissions, he recruited record
numbers of African-American students to law school and worked hard to find
financial support for them; as an associate vice president, he exerted behindthe-scenes pressure to encourage departments to diversify their faculties; and
as a classroom teacher, he taught about race and the criminal justice system.
But occasionally someone who did not know Greg or who was unaware of his
work would be astonished to learn that he was black and would question what
it meant to "be" black and yet look like Greg Williams. Life on the Color Line
responds to that central question of identity.
A tension this memoir cannot help but pose is whether we are reading
about the author's past or about our collective present. There were no labels
in 1950s America for much of what is described through Greg's young eyes.
"Domestic violence," "child sexual abuse," "codependency," and "sexual haMartha Chamalas is Professor of Law and Peter M. Shane is Dean and Professor of Law at the
University of Pittsburgh.
journal of Legal Education. Volume 46, Number I (March 1996)
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rassment" are all post-1970 terminology for phenomena clearly present before
they were named, but necessarily understood differently. GregWilliams paints
such cruelties vividly. In the process, he shows the intricate connections
between racism, poverty, and these other forms of abuse.
In this review, we concentrate on two dimensions of Greg Williams's life
story: his documentation of the cruelty of racism and his discovery of racial
identity. His father looms large in both these stories. It is an unsparing
portrait, but one offered in the spirit of forgiveness. The intertwined stories of
racism and identity help to explain why.
Race and Rejection
For the first ten years of his life, Greg (who was then called Billy) lived in
Virginia with his parents, his brother Mike, and a younger brother and sister.
Neither parent ever told the children about their background. Life was not
easy for Greg: his father drank heavily and brutalized his mother. Tony's
financial fortunes rose and fell as quickly as his moods. One year he made over
$50,000, had an exclusive townhouse in Alexandria, and drove a Cadillac; the
next year he was penniless and totally incapable of providing for his children.
The major trauma of Greg's childhood occurred when his mother abandoned him and Mike, taking the younger children with her as she fled from
Tony. Greg and Mike were virtually left to fend for themselves. Shortly before
they left for Muncie, their situation was desperate: their clothes were tattered
and dirty, they were hungry all the time, and they were devastated by their
inability to understand why such terrible things were happening to them. In
poignant, graphic detail, Greg recounts how the brothers coped with their
fear and emotional deprivation:
When school started in September, my hand shook with doubt as I pencilled
her name over "Mother" on my enrollment form. Reaching into my book bag,
I grabbed an ink pen, and I traced over "Mary Williams" so she couldn't sneak
into the school at night and erase her name. Homework kept me occupied,
but Mike lost interest in school. Every evening he sat perched on the tavern
steps like a motherless bird, eyes darting up and down Route 1, hoping Mom
would arrive in the next car drifting into our parking lot (25).
Even before Greg crossed the color line, the pain of rejection was a central
force in his life.
Greg began his life as a black boywhen Tony decided to leave the boys with
his mother in Muncie. Perhaps the most dramatic part of the book is Greg's
description of his transition to Muncie, a violent transition in which he and
Mike were forced to cope with intense poverty, neglect, and bewilderment
over their place in the world. Everything was different: Tony was now called
Buster, and the tall, thin, brown-skinned woman whom Greg had known in
Virginia as simply one of the hired help was revealed to be his grandmother,
Sallie. The squalor surrounding the lives of Greg's relatives was shocking to
the young boy. At first Greg thought Sallie's house was a tool shed. He was
revolted by the smell of the outhouse, scared by the nasty rooster patrolling
the yard, and even more afraid of the drunk and boisterous folks that hung
out every night at Sallie's house.
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Muncie reinforced the pain of rejection in the boys' lives. Their white
relatives in town refused to acknowledge them. Even though it was obvious
that Sallie's house was unsafe for the boys, none of Greg's relatives from his
mother's side offered any help. Instead, the boys' lives were literally saved by a
stranger-Miss Dora-a neighbor who took the boys into her home and paid
for everything out of the $25 she earned weekly as a maid. The love and
gratitude Greg felt for Miss Dora is evident throughout the book. He touchingly refers to her as his "truly mother" and is enraged because white people
cannot seem to comprehend why a woman who was not a blood relation
would ever choose to care for needy children..
Unlike much else in Muncie at the time, the public schools were racially
integrated; race-based rejection was not written into Indiana education law as
blatantly as in the Southern states. But race discrimination was efficiently
managed by powerful informal mechanisms. For example, there was an unwritten rule at Greg's school that the sixth-grade academic achievement award
was reserved for white children. In an especially painful passage, Greg recounts the assembly in which he learned that he had been robbed of the
honor he had earned as the top student in the class (125-26).
The sting of being passed over unfairly is what many people probably
identify as the crux of invidious discrimination. But much of the power of this
memoir lies in the different message Greg Williams conveys about the experience of discrimination. Though the line is a fine one to draw, the anger and
shame that discrimination engenders, in Greg's experience, seem not to stem
principally from an internalized sense of frustration or blatant unfairness. It is
the experience of discrimination as rejection, a motif in Greg's life from the
moment his mother abandoned him, that is the source of the pain of racism.
Some of the rejection Greg endured followed the familiar script of white
supremacy before the civil rights movement. Greg recounts how two little
white girls who had initially befriended him in school turned away in disgust
when they discovered he was black. His white appearance was often more
problematic than liberating. Greg soon learned that his "very existence made
people uncomfortable and shattered too many racial taboos" (166). He recalls
watching a Ku Klux Klan leader on TV shortly after Brown v. Board ofEducation
was decided:
[H] is nasal repetition of "mongrel mulatto" finally hit me like a thunderbolt.
He was talking about me. I was the Klan's worst nightmare. I was what the
violence directed against integration was all about. I was what they hated and
wanted to destroy. And that was the biggest puzzle in the world to me because
I had absolutely nothing (91).
Some of the rejection Greg endured was of a sort not well documented in
the familiar cultural scripts, perhaps because it involves relations among black
children. The playgrounds in Muncie were racially segregated but, even so,
there was no peace for Greg and his brother. Some of the black kids would
taunt them because they looked white, and Greg often found himself getting
into fights and screaming, "I ain't white" (119).
Buster had warned Greg that his relations with otherblack people would
be difficult. On their trip to Muncie, Buster told his son that Greg wguld have
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to be very careful in his new life because neither whites nor blacks liked "halfbreeds" (38). That proved to be not quite true. Although many blacks were
willing to accept Greg only gradually, and only after he proved his allegiance
to the black community, whites were far more threatened by Greg and his
"deceptive" appearance. Indeed, the harassment he experienced from some
blacks was different from the hostility of white teachers and classmates and
had a different origin. As Greg describes it, the anger blacks felt toward whites
was a response to hurt:
Though I continued to endure barbed teasing about my white relatives, I
began to take some solace in the belief that there were many more members
of the black community who wanted to ignore white relatives than one might
imagine. Denial of their full heritage was due less to anger and prejudice
toward their white families than the total and absolute rejection of their
existence by them (123).
In junior high, the color line intensified as the powers-that-be exerted
pressure to prevent black boys from dating white girls. The only "guidance"
Greg ever received from his school counselor was to stay away from a white girl
who had been pursuing him. The cruel irony was that when Greg chose to
date a dark-skinned girl, they both were met with jeers of "nigger lover." The
combination of racial and sexual taboos in Muncie made dating for Greg "like
swimming in shark-infested waters" (166). His brother Mike, however, followed their father's example and recklessly pursued both black and white
girls, undeterred by the many stories he and Greg heard about false claims of
interracial rape. In contrast, Greg became cautious about girls, repeatedly
vowing to devote all his energy to school and athletics.
The racial battlegrounds at school and on the playground did not pose the
biggest problem for Greg. The greatest challenge of his adolescent life was
how to handle his father, whose drinking and abuse had by this time gotten
totally out of control. A subplot of Life on the ColorLineis the struggle of Greg,
as the responsible son, to protect his father from himself. Next to Greg, Buster
Williams is the most highly developed character in the memoir. He is simultaneously the worst and the best parent. Unlike Greg's mother, Buster never
totally abandoned the children. He was a dreamer and a schemer who had
high hopes and expectations for Greg and gave him faith in his own ability.
But Buster also hurt Greg. He could be incredibly cruel and conniving. He
exacted "commissions" from his sons for thejobs he found for them, while his
own drinking prevented him from keeping any job for long. He was ready,
particularly when drunk, to berate his sons and play on their vulnerabilities.
Greg recounts one incident after he literally carried his drunk father home on
his "big shoulders," only to be told by Buster thatwhat Greg needed was "some
pussy to clear up those pimples" (175-76).
Greg's portrayal of his father makes clear that he sees the source of his
father's cruelty in the rejection and pain that Buster also suffered. Buster's
own father, a wealthy white man, never had anything to do with him. Buster's
mother had worked for his father as a maid; he fired her when she became
pregnant. Both blacks and whites taunted her "white nigger" baby and de-
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manded she leave town. When Buster was an adult, he went in search of his
father and tried to confront him. He found he could not even bring himself to
face his father and say, "I am your son."
Greg's account of his travails with his father will resonate with readers who
have been abused or neglected by their parents or who have suffered because
of a parent's illness. This theme in the memoir is universal and speaks
eloquently to the pain of children who are forced prematurely to nurture
their parents. But what is most compelling about Greg's portrayal of his father
is the way he traces the impact of racial oppression .on the development of his
father's character. Buster Williams was highly intelligent, one of Muncie's first
blacks to go to Howard University. He was a talented writer whose skills were
used by the local white politicians to draft campaign leaflets and speeches. But
when it came time for distributing patronage, Buster's only reward from City
Hall was ajanitor'sjob. Buster finally left Muncie when he was roughed up by
police, arrested on suspicion of burglary, and jailed for seven days. Buster's
political connections counted for nothing; as a black man, he could always be
put in his place. Even for a dreamer and hopeless optimist, it was hard not to
give in and give up.

The pain in Buster's life made itself manifest in many ways in the lives of his
sons. Perhaps most cruelly, he could not bring himself to offer any hope or
encouragement to Mike. In a wrenching episode, Buster makes his sons fight
for bets in a ribsjoint: "Boys, now square off. We're gonna see who is the best
man. The nigger or the white boy" (154). His description of his sons was
telling; he basically wrote off his academically less talented son as doomed to a
life of hustling. He told Greg that Mike's "gonna be a no-'count black bastard
just like me" (156).
The anguished longing that undergirds the pain of rejection does not
disappear over time. Like PatriciaJ. Williams in her autobiographical essay,'
Greg Williams describes how it is possible to detest the white part of your
heritage because it represents rejection and dispossession, and yet continue to
long for recognition from all your blood relatives. Greg's decision to live his
life as a black man never erased the longing for his mother or his desire to
have her realize the enormity of what he had to live through. His memoir
documents, in excruciating clarity, the cruelty of racism and ifs cost to the
human spirit.
Love and Identity
The complexities of race also form the primary backdrop for Greg Williams's
search for identity. With this theme, Li[e on the ColorLinecouldhardly be more
timely. Lately biracialism and the meaning of race itself have been in the
forefront of public discourse, from the debate about the categories used in the
U.S. census to the controversies over affirmative action and mixed-race adoptions. The memoir contributes much to this discussion. Perhaps because the

1. On Being the Object of Property, zn The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law
Professor 216 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
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book does more than simply present an argument-because it represents a
life work as well as an extraordinary life-it is full of insights with theoretical
significance.
We began to appreciate the subtleties of Greg Williams's account of racial
identity when we considered the puzzle posed by his subtitle: The True Story of a
White Boy WhoDiscovered He Was Black. How could Greg have been a "white boy"
and then, later, a "black boy"? Was he both "white" and "black" all along? The
move to Muncie changed nothing about either Greg's genes or his genealogy.
Could Greg have discovered he was a "black boy" without moving to Muncie?
These dilemmas are most puzzling ifwe insist on thinking of race and racial
identity as immutable characteristics. Of course, Greg's story is unusual because few people change their understanding of their own and their families'
identity as radically and as rapidly as Greg did on that fateful trip to Muncie.
But Life on the ColorLine does reveal a more universal insight: namely, that it is
a constellation of circumstances, of which skin tone is but one, that creates the
potential for racial identity. Within the potential range of identities, a single
person can experience racial identity in plural form; in some forms, racial
identity is something people choose-and choose deliberately-at a number
of points in their lives.
Greg initially acquired the potential for a new racial identity through his
father's disclosure of the truth about himself. Greg's new knowledge allowed
him to see his father in a different light and to reposition himself in a changed
world. His reaction demonstrates dramatically that race is not a fixed trait
apart from people's perceptions:
I saw my father as I never had seen him before. The veil dropped from his face
and features. Before my eyes he was transformed from a swarthy Italian to his
true self-a high-yellow mulatto. My father was a Negrol We were coloredl
After ten years in Virginia on the white side of the color line, I knew what that
meant (34).
But Greg's potential for a black identity also depended on his experience
with black people and on his pursuit of this new knowledge. His father's
disclosures inspired Greg to look more closely at black children and develop a
more complex understanding of color, to break down the dichotomous view
of black and white into a spectrum or continuum of difference. On the
playground of "black" children there was suddenly "every imaginable hue of
brown, ranging from deep chocolate to the color of the speckled light brown
eggs we found in Aunt Bess's henhouse. And now two palefaces-Mike and
me" (51).
It is critical to Greg's account that his "discovery" that he was black did not
occur in the single moment he learned of the fact of his father's biracial
background. He repositioned himself as a black person only gradually, and he
was influenced by forces far deeper than the recognition that he had many
"honey, brown, and chocolate" relatives. A clear message from Life on the Color
Line is that, as experienced by the individual, racial identity is relational and
emotional, dependent on personal experience and practical human need. We
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have no doubt after reading this memoir that Greg Williams identifies himself
as a black man, rather than as a white man or biracial man.
Greg "became" black, however, because of two important factors. First, at
key points in his life crucial black people embraced him and gave him a sense
of belonging while, for the most part, white people rejected him. Buster, for
all his shortcomings, was probably the most important strength in Greg's early
life. Emotionally, Miss Dora, not Mary Williams, was Greg's mother. The
rejection by his mother and her relatives not only produced anger and pain; it
altered Greg's sense of himself. Even for a ten-year-old child, the sense of
self was dependent on reinforcement from his family and from those who
loved him.
Second, the more Greg came to understand the situation of American
blacks, the more their history-a history of rejection, perseverance, and
achievement-came to provide a narrative within which he could make sense
of his life. Among the most revealing passages in the book is Greg's internal
response to his father after Buster suggests that when Greg leaves Muncie, he
too can pass for white:
I hadn't wanted to be colored, but too much had happened to me in
Muncie to be a part of the white world that had rejected me so completely. I
believed that most of Dad's problems stemmed from his attempt to "pass for
white" in Virginia.... If Walter White could choose to remain in the black
community and make a difference, so could I.... I knew who I was and what
I wanted to be (157).
This is not to suggest that, in all aspects, the acquisition of racial identity is
a matter of choice. An obvious question is why Greg had to be rigidly classified
by so many people in his life as either white or black, given that he had one
white parent and one biracial parent. The answer from the memoir is plain:
there was little space for biracialism in segregated Muncie in the 1950s and
early 1960s. In the public realm, personal choice about racial identity had
little room to operate. As a youngster, Greg was offered choices so constrained
as not to be meaningful.
Although Greg's pale skin made it possible for others sometimes to think
of him as white, the ideology of white supremacy in Muncie made it practically
impossible for him to "be" white and survive. Whites would not tolerate
anyone known to have black relatives, as Greg painfully discovered when his
two little white friends in elementary school abandoned him. Moreover, the
policing of the color line made it inevitable that people would find out about
him. The teachers from the elementary school made sure that the staff at the
junior high school were not fooled by Greg's appearance. On Greg's confidential high school record, there was a notation that his father was "colored,"
even though "from outward appearance" Greg looked white (257).
It took considerable human effort to maintain the color line, and ambiguous situations were carefully managed to make them seem unambiguous. By
the time Greg was in high school, he had already had considerable experience
negotiating the dilemma of looking white and being black. When he had to
select where to sit in the auditorium, with whites on one side and blacks on the
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other, hejoined the black students, realizing that he "had no real decision to
make" (191). One of his black classmates astutely analyzed Greg's decision to
sit with the black students as making his life "less complicated" because,
sooner or later, the white students would find out about him and reject him.
Choosing to sit with the black students assured that Greg would not find
himself an outcast with no group willing to associate with him.
Consistent with his treatment of racial identity, the view of family that Greg
Williams paints in Life on the ColorLine emphasizes nurture over nature. Greg
acknowledges an inexpressible debt to Miss Dora, who truly became his
mother. Likewise, Buster did not fail as a father, because at critical times in
Greg's life he showed faith and pride in his son. The emphasis here is on
actions, lived-out relationships, and displays of love and a sense of belonging,
rather than biology or genetics.2
Finally, Greg Williams does not stake the case for the authenticity of his
blackness on the exclusion of whites from his life. We learn in the memoir that
Sara, his true love in high school and now his wife, is a white woman. And now
that their two biological children are grown, Greg and Sara have adopted two
boys from Honduras. What Greg's life seems to say, as eloquently as it can be
said, is that identity depends on those who accept and love you and provide
you with the strongest sense of yourself.

When he was in the tenth grade, Greg Williams came across the classic
study Middletown, by Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd. - The Lynds had
dissected Muncie in the 1920s as the typical American town. The town their
study constructed, however, was racially and ethnically homogeneous. Indeed,
in their quest for typicality the Lynds deliberately sought out a town with
comparatively few blacks or foreign-born citizens and built their narrative
around interviews of white people only. Middletown was a disappointment
for Greg because it revealed nothing about the lives of black people-even
though blacks already constituted six percent of the population when
the Lynds did their research, and the Ku Klux Klan was a powerful force in
the town.
The Muncie we see in Life on tle ColorLine is remarkably different from the
Lynds'. Greg Williams has constructed a Muncie in which racial difference is
at the center of the narrative-a complex town that is both segregated and
integrated, where the color line must constantly be policed because it might
otherwise be seen as blurry, deceptive, and shifting. Embedded within Greg
Williams's memoir is a rich contemporaryversion of Middletownwhich grapples
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with the themes of race, identity, family, poverty, and human motivation
and desire.
In Life on the ColorLine,GregWilliams tells his life story with humor, without
hate, and with the understanding of someone who has experienced the world
from different positions and perspectives. The universal quality of the memoir
is its demonstration that a little boy can be hurt by a society fixated on
maintaining racial categories and hierarchy, yet still have the spirit to emerge
whole. Greg Williams shows us the dark side of Middletown but, in the
process, gives us hope.

Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State: A CriticalAnalysis of
Religion ClauseJurisprudence.Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. Pp. x + 196.
Reviewed by George W. Dent, Jr.
The Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence is so chaotic that criticizing it is shooting fish in a barrel. In The Rhetoric of Church and State: A Critical
Analysis of Religion ClauseJurisprudence,Frederick Mark Gedicks, professor of
law at Brigham Young University, explores the genesis of this confusion. He
ascribes it to "the displacement of a religiously informed communitarian
discourse on public morality and politics by a secular, neutral, individualist
discourse on such matters" (page 4). Secular individualism "considers religion
to be an irrational and regressive antisocial force that must be strictly confined
to private life in order to avoid social division, violence, and anarchy" (12).
This "privatization" thesis has been advanced before-Gedicks is one of its
pioneers-but The Rhetoric of Church and State gives it its deepest development
to date and thus presents an opportunity to evaluate the thesis.
Gedicks says religious communitarianism "incorporates... interdenominational conservative religious beliefs and practices" and holds that "government may act to encourage religious traditions that nurture and reinforce
conservative cultural values" (11). In the 1960s a secular individualist majority
on the Supreme Court repudiated religious communitarianism and embraced
Jefferson's metaphor of separation of church and state as its talisman. The
metaphor alone does not explain the Court's behavior, however: "While the
majority of Americans support the general principle of separation of church
and state, most strongly disagree with the strictness and vigor with which the
Supreme Court has located and policed the boundary" (3).
As Gedicks says, the Court's new attitude was not warranted by the intentions of the framers of the First and Fourteenth Amendments (14-21). The
privatization theory, however, admirably explains why the Court carried
separationism to such lengths. For example, to give students in private (including parochial) schools a fraction of the state aid afforded to students in
government schools would not seem to the founders or to most Americans
today to traduce separation of church and state. If one views religion as a
strictly private matter, though, decisions forbidding such aid make sense.
Gedicks also discusses the confusion in religion clause jurisprudence since
the '60s. In the Supreme Court religious communitarianism, "while unmistakably defeated, was not wholly vanquished" (4): secular individualists on the
Court still must reconcile precedents based on different principles, win over
George W.Dent, Jr., is Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
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ambivalentjustices, and mollify a public thatwould reject some applications of
secular individualism. Likewise, justices opposed to secular individualism are
compelled by stare decisis and the search for concurring votes to adopt the
rhetoric of secular individualism. As a result, the Court employs that rhetoric
even in decisions that in substance conflict with the thesis. Thus the Court
upholds aid to or celebration of religion by implausibly claiming that the aid
has secular benefits (as with property tax exemptions for churches), that the
recipient is not truly religious (as with religious colleges receiving state aid),
or that the matter celebrated is not truly religious (as with Christmas displays).
This reasoning generates inconsistency because secular benefits or purposes
can always be found in government actions or in recipients of government aid
if one stretches far enough.
Secular individualism professes religious neutrality. But it defines neutrality to mean not that government must neither promote nor hinder any one
sect or religion generally in the competition among belief systems, but that
religion is to be relegated to the private sphere and there left alone. Thus
when faced with a law requiring that creationism be treated equally when
evolution was taught in public schools, the Court opted for privatization over
neutrality and held the law invalid.' Similarly, secular individualism opposes
government aid to religion. In a minimal government, like the early American
republic, the neutrality and no-aid principles could coexist; but, in a welfare
state, aiding secular institutions (like public schools) and not aiding religious
institutions (like parochial schools) is not neutral but disadvantageous to
religion. Unwilling or unable to forbid all aid, though, the Court muddles
along aimlessly from case to case.
Similarly, privatization accounts for the often anguished debate about
whether the Supreme Court is hostile to religion. For those who view religion
as strictly a private matter, the Court's secular individualism is neutral, even
protective, toward religion. But secular individualism discriminates against,
and therefore is considered hostile by, those who oppose this view and who
believe that religion may enter the public square and share in the benefits of
government-whether on a preferential basis, as religious communitarians
hold, or on a neutral basis, as some others favor.
Secular individualism construes the Free Exercise Clause to exempt religionists from an ostensibly neutral law that imposes unusual burdens on them
because of their faith unless an exemption from the law would defeat a
compelling governmental interest; but it does not permit the clause to confer
any secular advantage on religionists. This rationale is sometimes deployed to
reach religious communitarian results by exaggerating the importance of the
governmental interest or secular benefits of a religious exemption. Most
notably, in Employment Division v. Smith2 the Court virtually nullified the Free
Exercise Clause by holding that it does not exempt religious believers from
compliance with generally applicable laws regardless of how heavy the burden
on their faith and how slight the governmental interest in denying the exemp1.
2.
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tion. A religious communitarian would justify this decision by the power of
government to support the majority's religious values. The Court, however,
invoked secular individualist discourse by raising a specter that broad free
exercise exemptions would provoke social strife.
Gedicks does not point out that secular individualists do not always apply
their principles of free exercise consistently. For example, they often oppose
free exercise exemptions from laws forbidding discrimination based on race,
sex, and sexual orientation and exemptions of public school children from
classes that offend their faith. Such exemptions seem consistent with secular
individualism's professed support of individual choice in religion and of
exemptions from burdens that confer no material secular advantage. Again,
privatization could untangle the knot; secular individualism opposes religious
exemptions only for private behavior, not for activity in the public schools or
the public square.
Still, the secular individualists on the Supreme Court have favored a broader
definition of free exercise than their opponents. Gedicks nonetheless seems
to criticize them for rejecting free exercise exemptions that would confer
secular advantages. Clearly there must be some limit on free exercise exemptions, though. It would be difficult to confirm the sincerity of someone who
claims, for example, a religious objection to paying any taxes. Unlimited
exemptions would also discriminate against and breed resentment among
those not exempted. During the Vietnam conflict the statutory military draft
exemption for conscientious objectors angered others even though objectors
had to perform noncombat service. What strife would have occurred if
the Supreme Court had construed free exercise to exempt objectors from all military service? It is fair to ask what limiting principle Gedicks
proposes instead.
Gedicks does not challenge the premises underlying secular individualism.
Secularists view religion as divisive and oppressive, but history's worst slaughter and oppression have been perpetrated by anti-religious regimes-Nazi
Germany, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Nor has the Supreme
Court's secularism reduced religious strife. There is less conflict over public
funding of education in countries like Holland that provide equal funds to
parochial schools than in America, where only minimal aid is permitted.
There is also less friction here over state funding of colleges, which extends to
private (including religious) schools, than there is to state funding of elementary and secondary schools.
Gedicks also mistakenly accepts the claim that religion rests on faith while
secular opinions stand on reason and empiricism (31). Values may be based
on religious or secular beliefs, but reason alone cannot generate values.
Indeed, although religion is often intolerant, many ideals of American democracy originated in the Protestant Enlightenment. Thus the Declaration of
Independence proclaims that "all men are created equal, endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights." Secular discourse can also sustain
individual freedom, but the history of the twentieth century shows that it often
does not. The barbarity of many nonreligious regimes in the twentieth century
may help to explain why secularism never captured the American public and
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now seems to be ebbing even in its home on the political left. Examining these
problems of secularism might also have helped Gedicks to admit rather than
deny the possibility of a third discourse.
Though critical of secular individualism, Gedicks opposes a turn (or return) to religious communitarianism, which would provide "direct financial
grants to majoritarian religious organizations [and] public school instruction
by ministers and priests" (122) and "tolerate religious dissenters only to the
extent that their practices do not threaten majoritarian religious values"
(116). Gedicks considers some of these possibilities "frightening" (122) and
"undesirable" (123). Thus: "Religious communitarian discourse is not a viable
alternative to secular individualism." As for a third discourse that would be
coherent and satisfying, Gedicks says: "I know of no such discourse and doubt
that one yet exists." Indeed, the two discourses are "antithetical," so "efforts to
mediate a compromise position between the two are doomed" (123).
Gedicks's critique of religious communitarianism is fragmentary-almost
an afterthought-and problematic. Many critics of secular individualism do
not advocate "direct financial grants to majoritarian religious organizations,
public school instruction by priests and ministers, and repression of minority
religions." Gedicks condemns the Supreme Court's virtual repeal of the Free
Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith but fails to mention that
Congress then overwhelmingly passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 3 which reinstated the compelling governmental interest test in free exercise cases. Most of those voting for the act were not secular individualists. Even
if a coherent third discourse does not yet exist, clearly many-perhaps mostAmericans do not fall into the only two camps that Gedicks recognizes.
Gedicks's pessimism about compromise is warranted to the extent that no
compromise will satisfy everyone, but I think that most Americans are willing,
even eager, to find a compromise.
Still, Gedicks's critique of religious communitarianism is valuable. He
cannot be dismissed as a secularist demonizing religious believers; he is
religious, and his fears are sincere and have some basis.Justice Scalia, for one,
does not construe the religion clauses to pose any obstacle to the kind of
religious communitarianism that Gedicks dreads. Decisions like Smith (in
which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion) fuel apprehension that his
views will triumph in the Court. Other opponents of secular individualism
must show people like Gedicks that they would not create his parade of
horrors-that is, they must demonstrate the possibility of a third discourse.
The founders' belief in religious freedom, which was rooted in their own
religious beliefs, offers at least the basis for a third discourse. Some justices
and scholars champion religious neutrality: government should neither promote nor hinder religion generally or any sect in particular. Authentic neutrality opposes both secular individualism, which Gedicks rightly says is not
truly neutral toward religion, and religious communitarianism, which does
not even claim to be. Although disagreement about details in the meaning
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of neutrality is inevitable, it seems as plausible an approach as the two
Gedicks criticizes.
The Rhetoric of Church and State explains why the Supreme Court, while
proclaiming the principle of separation of church and state endorsed by most
Americans, nonetheless reaches results opposed by most Americans, and
while proclaiming religious neutrality reaches results that are widely perceived as not neutral but hostile to religion. It also shows why the confusion in
religion clause jurisprudence does not stem from simple sloppiness on the
Court but from the nature of secular individualism and its status on the
Court and in society. Finally, it challenges those who reject both secular
individualism and Gedicks's nightmare of intolerant religious communitarianism to come forth with a plausible alternative. That is an impressive set
of achievements.

Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995. Pp. viii + 229.
Reviewed by Louis Fisher
In this tightly written and stimulating book, Martin Redish takes issue with
scholars who have urged the judiciary to withdraw from structural issuesfederalism and separation of powers-and leave those disputes to accommodations fashioned by the political branches and the states. Having relinquished this area of responsibility, the courts would then concentrate on
matters involving individual rights and liberties.
Redish does not believe that the courts can, or should, accept such a
division of work. Instead of being able to distinguish between political structure and rights, with the first issue parceled out to the elected branches and
the second to the judiciary, Redish sees a "vital symbiotic relationship" between political structure and issues of individual liberty. He argues that an
attempt to draw a dichotomy, for purpose ofjudicial review, between issues of
structure and rights "dangerously undermines the complex intersecting network of protections the Constitution gave us against the onset of tyranny"
(page vii).
As Redish notes, it is ironic that contemporary scholars would associate
judicial review with individual rights and liberties and encourage the courts to
abandon review of issues involving federalism and separation of powers. The
draft constitution agreed to at the Philadelphia convention was largely a
structural framework designed, through a system of checks and balances, to
protect individual liberties. Political power would be divided between the state
and national governments, and divided again among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Preoccupation with specific rights did not come
until the adoption of the Bill of Rights. From the standpoint of constitutional
history and theory, any "purported dichotomy between constitutional structure and constitutional rights is a dangerous and false one" (4). Certainly the
courts have a right to strike down any executive or legislative action that
attempt to encroach upon the independence of the judiciary.
On this basic and fundamental point, Redish is surely on firm ground. In
recent years, the Court itself has reaffirmed that it has fundamental responsibilities in monitoring federalism and separation of powers, and that it cannot
leave those determinations solely to the play of political forces in the elective
branches. Having announced in 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
TransitAuthority,' that issues of federalism would be left essentially to political
Louis Fisher is Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers with the Congressional Research Service.
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accommodations worked out between the national government and the states,
the Court has now reinvolved itself in federalism disputes.2 Of course, over the
past dozen years the Court has decided a number of important separation of
powers issues, ranging from the legislative veto to the comptroller general's
3
powers under the Gramm-Rudman Act and the independent counsel.
Yet the problem comes not so much from scholars who encourage the
courts to abandon scrutiny of structural issues as from the willingness and the
desire ofjudges to turn their attention elsewhere. As a prescription, we can
advise the Supreme Court to "intensify its enforcement of the constitutional
provisions dealing with political structure, for the simple reason that the
Constitution's text unambiguously dictates the existence of a specific governmental form" (6). That is correct, but courts may, for reasons related to their
own institutional needs, decide to give short shrift to many issues involving
constitutional structures and limits. What do we do then? Criticize judges
for neglecting their duties? Impeach them for failing to carry out their oath
of office?
For example, in recent decades there have been many efforts to bring war
power issues to the courts for adjudication. Because of standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions, equitable discretion, and so forth,judges simply
refuse to reach the merits. Some scholars recommend that any member of
Congress should be authorized to bring an action in federal court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that a presidential war
action has violated statutory policy. But efforts to compel judges to decide
cases are both unwise and unconstitutional. The question of what constitutes a
case or controversy must be left to judges. If they decide, for institutional
reasons, to duck an issue, no power from other branches can order them to
confront what they do not want to confront. For a number of good reasons,
including lack of judicial competence, judges may properly conclude that
4
disputes over the war power are best left to the elected branches.
Another constitutional issue thatjudges decide to sidestep is the Statement
and Account Clause. In Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, the framers placed an
explicit safeguard for financial accountability: "[A] regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time." Through these public statements, citizens
would know how tax money had been spent.
Nevertheless, ever since 1949 we have been funding through covert means
the intelligence community, which consists of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and other governmental agencies. The amount
of money provided to the intelligence community is estimated at about $27
billion annually, and yet none of that money is identified publicly. Instead, it is
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hidden in various appropriations bills for the Department of Defense, the
State Department, and other agencies. An effort to take this issue to the Court
to compel compliance with the Statement and Account Clause was rebuffed
when the Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit.5
Similarly, there is a substantial constitutional issue when presidents terminate treaties on their own, without legislative involvement. If treaties are like
statutes,' and it takes joint action by the president and the Senate to make a
treaty, how can treaties be terminated unilaterally by the president? When
President Jimmy Carter terminated the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan,
Senator Barry Goldwater took the matter to court to determine the constitutional issue. The justices split along so many lines that their opinions shed
little light on the president's power to terminate treaties.Justice Powell would
have dismissed the complaint as not ripe forjudicial review.Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens, viewed the
matter as a nonjusticiable political question that should never be considered
by the courts. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, believed that the
Court should have set the case for oral argument and given it plenary consideration. Justice Brennan disagreed that the matter was a political question.
Justice Marshall, without writing a separate opinion, concurred in dismissing
Goldwater's complaint.'
It is too much to argue that a theory of judicial abdication "improperly
implies that the Court is free to pick and choose the constitutional provisions
it is willing to enforce. Nothing in the proper nature of the judiciary's role
authorizes it effectively to repeal provisions in the Constitution" (20). Later in
the book Redish issues this warning: "If the judiciary is given authority to
choose which provisions to enforce, abandonment of the individual liberty
provisions in favor of the structural guarantees is just as conceivable ajudicial
option as the reverse. Neither alternative, however, should be available to the
judiciary" (164).
When the Court fails to act, it does not repeal provisions in the Constitution. It simply leaves their enforcement to the elected branches or to the legal
dynamics of another day. It is not a question of the Court's "abandoning"
certain provisions in the Constitution. It is usually a question of timing,
prudence, or the form in which a dispute reaches the Court. Redish's position
sounds a little too much like ChiefJustice Marshall's admonition: "It is most
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally
true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should."' The fact is that no Court,
including the one presided over by Marshall, has followed that theory.
5.
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7.

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).

8.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

Journal of Legal Education
Redish believes that the courts have special strengths and qualities that
allow them to decide matters of constitutional structure. Because of "formal
insulation from majoritarian political pressures, the judiciary was the best
suited of the three branches to interpret the countermajoritarian Constitution and to protect its principles." The judiciary could fulfill this function "by
remaining free from majoritarian pressures" and by becoming a "countermajoritarian body" (8).
Whatever merit these points have in theory, the history of the Court seems
to run in the other direction. After ChiefJustice Marshall established judicial
review in Marburyv. Madison,9 the Court's political role was to uphold congressional statutes involving the application of national power. It did not become a
countermajoritarian body. Instead, it legitimated what Congress had done.
When the judiciary later decided to become countermajoritarian by using
substantive due process to strike down federal and state statutes that attempted to ameliorate economic conditions, Congress, the president, and the
country rebelled. The Court knows that it has a countermajoritarian role, but
if it plays that card too frequently, and with political insensitivity, it will pay a
price. The posture of being consistently countermajoritarian in a democratic
society is not sustainable.
Redish further notes: "If the majoritarian branches could sit in final judgment on the constitutionality of their own actions, there would, as a practical
matter, be little point in having imposed formalized countermajoritarian
constitutional limitations in the first place" (8). One could just as well say: "If
the countermajoritarian branch (the judiciary) sits in final judgment on
constitutional questions, there would, as a practical matter, be little point in
having elected branches and a representative democracy." Who checks the
judiciary? What is there in two centuries of judicial review to merit such
confidence in the judgment of the courts?
How much activism we should want from the judiciary has been debated
ever since 1789, with no resolution to date and no resolution expected for the
future. We want the courts to monitor the political branches and act as a
check, but we want, also, judicial self-restraint. Through painful missteps, the
courts have learned the dangers of overextending themselves. In a famous
article, Alexander M. Bickel concluded that judicial methods of avoiding a
decision on the merits were essential attributes of an unelected judiciary in a
democratic society, particularly "a large and heterogeneous" society like the
United States. The American political system would "explode" unless it exercised the "arts of compromise" and discovered ways "to muddle through."
Bickel summed up his political theory neatly: "No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden." 0
The final chapter of the book is devoted to the problem of Congress's
delegating its power to other branches. The post-New Deal Supreme Court, as

9.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 49
(1961).
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Redish points out, "substantially relax[ed] the constitutional limits on legislative delegation." "Purely as a matter of constitutional theory, it is difficult to
understand the Court's abandonment of the limits on delegation." By constitutional theory, Redish means the text of Article I, Section 1, which vests the
legislative power in Congress. "No other branch of government is given power
to 'legislate"' (135). Redish concedes that definitional questions will arise as to
whether an action should be characterized purely as "legislative power" or
whether it is executive action under statutory power. Still, he says "there can
be little doubt thatjudicial abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine has
authorized breaches of the definitional limitations" (136).
Interest in the delegation issue can come from two directions. Redish is
concerned about the Court's abandonment of the limits on delegation. One
could be equally concerned about the Court's decisions, in 1935, to strike
down a delegation of congressional power to the president." That is the only
time a delegation to the president has been invalidated. What is of most
interest? The "abandonment" of judicial scrutiny after 1935 or the Court's
injection of the nondelegation doctrine that year? For all the criticism of
legislative delegation to the executive branch, no one has offered a credible
and practical theory that would guide the Court on this question, and it is
unlikely that anyone will.

11. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Election Law: Cases and Materials.Durham: Carolina
Academic Press, 1995. Pp. xxi + 821.
Reviewed by Richard L. Hasen
The AALS Directory of Law Teachers does not yet list teachers of Election
Law as it currently lists teachers of established courses such as Torts or Law
and Economics. Indeed, a perusal of the directory's biographies of scholars
writing in the election law field reveals that they teach such courses as Law and
Political Participation, Law of the American Political Process, and Speech and
Money. Daniel Hays Lowenstein's masterful new casebook promises to establish a canon of election law materials and to set the stage for inclusion of
election law as a course that every serious law school will want to include in
its offerings.
It is a course eminently worthy of study by law teachers and law students
alike. Although few students studying the material will practice election law,
the majoritywho do notwill benefitfrom studying some of the mostimportant
questions about the way the law shapes political participation in the United
States. To take just two recent examples, election law concerns itself with the
proper role race should play in drawing lines for legislative districts and the
level ofjudicial protection to be afforded to those on the wrong end of a ballot measure, such as undocumented aliens in California and gays in Oregon
and Colorado.
But Lowenstein does more than present the intricate constitutional and
statutory questions that arise in areas ranging from the right to vote to
political patronage to campaign finance. Instead, he connects three separate
worlds: the rarefied world ofjudges who decide election law cases; the (perhaps more rarefied) world of scholars who study the role of law and legal
institutions in the political process; and the rough-and-tumble real world of
America's politicians. The casebook demonstrates thatjudicial views of "good
politics" drive most election law cases. For this reason alone, election law is
worthy of study as a subject in its own right; the topic deserves more attention
than instructors can afford to pay to it in other courses like Constitutional Law.
Scope and Coverage
Lowenstein's advantage in compiling an election law casebook is apparent
when one considers the breadth of his scholarship' as well as his practical
Richard L. Hasen is Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. He thanks Hal Krent and
Shel Nahmod for useful comments and suggestions, and he notes in the interest of full disclosure
that he is Dan Lowenstein's former student.
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See, e.g., Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 Tex. L. Rev.
1741 (1993); Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in Political Gerryman-
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experience as former chairman of the California Fair Political Practices Commission. Lowenstein draws upon his own work and life experience, often with
self-deprecating wit,' to entice the reader to consider the real-world consequences of legal doctrine on political power relationships in this country.
I used the new casebook for the first time in fall 1995, and I believe
Lowenstein sensibly edits cases and scholarly works, complementing them
with provocative note material; if anything, he errs on the side of overinclusiveness in his 821 pages. The teacher's manual is particularly good at discussing possible answers to questions posed in the note material, and at suggesting
various pedagogical exercises to stimulate student thought. Though the casebook lacks a subject index, it contains a comprehensive table of cases and
table of authorities.
The book's sixteen chapters cover four general subject areas: voting and
representation, ballot propositions, political parties, and campaign finance.
Before Lowenstein gets into these subject areas, he uses Chapter 1 to present
classic writings on representative government, and to set up progressivism and
pluralism as two rival political theories that do battle throughout the casebook. The concept of representation forms the basis for answering core
questions appearing later in the casebook. By returning to the themes in
Chapter 1 throughout the book, Lowenstein should convince the skeptical
reader that political theory is alive and well (albeit barely acknowledged) in
judicial opinions considering election law issues.
Chapters 2 through 5 consider voting and representation. The analysis
begins with the right to vote itself, presenting a brief history of suffrage and
enfranchisement in the United States. It also contains a discussion of the
controversy over the reasons for declining American voter turnout and whether
the recently enacted motor voter law will reverse the trend. Chapter 2 also
debates the constitutionality and desirability of giving legal aliens the right to
vote. This topic stimulates a lively and useful debate among the students early
in the semester on the nature and value of the vote.
Chapter 3 then delves into the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on voting
qualifications, and the right to an equally weighted vote. Perhaps surprisingly,
Lowenstein begins not with the seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims,3 which
prohibited on equal protection grounds unequally populated state legislative
districts, but rather with the later case of Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15.1 The decision to begin with Kramer is pedagogically sound because
Kramerpresents a nice segue from the material in Chapter 2. Kramer estab-

dering and the Courts, ed. Bernard Grofman, 64 (New York, 1990); On Campaign Finance

Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301 (1989); Political
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784 (1985) [hereinafter

2.

Political Bribery].
For example: "Masochists and insomniacs will welcome the news that the debate over
whether campaign contributions can be corrupt is resumed in essays by Cain, Strauss, and

3.
4.

Lowenstein .. ." (506).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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lishes that, unlike aliens, who regularly are excluded from voting, resident
citizen adults otherwise qualified to vote may not be excluded from local
elections. The notes following Kramerprobe whether voting should be limited
to resident citizen adults, and, perhaps more important as a stimulant to
critical thinking, the notes consider the judicial sleight-of-hand used by the
Kramer court to reach the result it wanted without overruling precedent
upholding fairly administered literacy tests (pages 69-71).
Chapters 4 and 5 move on to one of the thorniest issues the Supreme Court
has faced in recent years, legislative districting. Following a brief look at the
question of precisely how equal the population of legislative districts must be
(101-02), Chapter 4 analyzes the criteria used to draw legislative districts.
Lowenstein does a good job setting up the dichotomy between "formal"
criteria for districting, such as compactness and contiguousness, and "resultoriented" criteria, which "take into account the expected political consequences of the districts" (115), and he forcefully argues that gerrymandering
is an inherently political act, even when only "formal" criteria are used. The
remainder of Chapter 4 focuses on Davis v. Bandemer5 in which the Supreme
Court considered the justiciability and standard for a gerrymandering case
brought by members of a political party.
Chapter 5 presents some of the most interesting material in the casebook,
but also some of the most difficult to teach. Focusing on Supreme Court
redistricting cases, and especially cases decided following the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Lowenstein explains the requirements for,
and limits upon, race-based legislative districting. The chapter pays particular
attention to the squeeze put upon legislators and courts trying to draw districts
consistent both with the VRA and the Constitution following Shaw v. RenoO and
7
Miller v. Johnson.
The chapter is difficult to teach because there is both too much and too
little material on the VRA. For example, Chapter 5 contains a detailed discussion of the relationship between sections 2 and 5 of the amended VRA (18385). But the discussion immediately follows Thornburg v. Gingles,8 which
Lowenstein, in the teacher's manual (47), rightly terms a "monster" case
requiring a close reading by the students. With a focus on Gingles, most of the
students will gloss over the detailed VRA discussion that follows in the notes.
To do justice to the discussion and others like it would require spending days
on the notes in addition to the principal cases (and that would only scratch
the surface of VRAjurisprudence unrelated to the districting question). On
the other hand, ignoring the complex VRA questions makes any understanding of the recent Supreme Court cases incomplete. Perhaps Lowenstein has
done the bestjob possible for someone who wants to do more with an election
law casebook than consider only the role of race in legislative districting.

5.

478 U.S. 109 (1986).

6.

113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).

7.

115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).

8.

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Lowenstein devotes Chapter 6 to issues related to ballot propositions.
Chapter 6 easily could have appeared right after Chapter 1, because the
desirability of "direct democracy" measures such as the initiative, the referendum, and the recall pose a direct challenge to Madison's arguments for
representative democracy as a cure for the dangers of faction. The chapter
considers the desirability of ballot measures and traces the progressivist push
for increased use of direct democracy devices. Chapter 6 concludes with a
look at various laws limiting the scope and breadth of ballot measures, and
with the question of when and how courts should review the constitutionality
of ballot measures.
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on legal issues related to political parties. Chapter 7
begins with a detailed examination of the responsible party government
normative position, that strong political parties are required for accountability and the coherence of government programs. Although Lowenstein conceives of responsible party government as closely related to pluralist theory
(18), the two present alternative normative positions, 9 and Lowenstein could
have included the responsible party government normative position more
prominently among the political theories described in Chapter 1.
The remainder of Chapter 7 concerns legal issues involving the two major
political larties. After a discussion of the White Primary Cases, in which the
Supreme Court had to circumvent the state action doctrine to prevent the
Texas Democratic Party from excluding African-Americans in choosing its
candidates, Lowenstein runs through a series of cases testing the extent to
which legislatures may regulate the internal affairs of political parties. This is
the only place in the casebook where Lowenstein allows his own fascination
with a topic to prevent more sensible editing; the issues involved are simply
too tangential and too lacking in practical significance to justify forty-three
pages (and five principal cases). Chapter 7 ends with a good discussion of the
constitutional limits placed on the practice of political patronage.
Chapter 8 examines the law related to third parties and independent
candidates. The chapter makes the important point that although ballot
access laws, the lack of equal (or any) public financing in presidential elections, and unequal access to televised debates may to some extent hamper the
efforts of minor candidates, it is the winner-take-all single-district electoral
system that best explains the failure of third parties to break the two-party
monopoly. Justice White's majority opinion andJustice Marshall's dissenting
0
follow, and they nicely set forth
opinion in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party"
contrasting views of the role of third parties in American democracy.
Pluralist theory is both a positive and a normative theory. Positively, it argues that the political
process is best understood as a struggle among groups. Normatively, it argues that the
outcome of group struggle is generally satisfactory. See p. 18; but see Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign
Finance Vouchers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1996) (arguing for an "egalitarian pluralism," with a
normative goal of assuring groups roughly equal political capital). Responsible party government is a normative theory about the proper role for legislators given the positive insights of
pluralist theory. Responsible party government rjects the normative pluralist view that the
outcome of group struggle is generally satisfactory. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline
of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, Daedalus, Summer 1980, at 25 (relrintelat
300-15).
10. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).

9.
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The final major topic, campaign finance, consumes nearly half the book's
pages. Chapter 9 begins with a study of political bribery, and focuses on the
question whether and how a campaign contribution may be considered "corrupt." The chapter closely tracks Lowenstein's argument in his 1985 bribery
article I that most campaign contribution bribery cases turn on whether the
defendant had a "corrupt" intent, and that defining corruption requires some
"intermediate theory of politics" regarding the proper extent of influence
over legislators.
Having whetted our appetites by demonstrating the elusiveness of the
distinction between legitimate campaign contributions and political bribery,
Lowenstein turns in Chapter 10 to some hard facts about the role of money in
American politics and to competing perspectives on whether campaign contributions can be corrupt. A teacher pressed for time can easily skip this latter
material; the issues presented there come up time and again in the chapters
that follow.
Chapter 11 is devoted almost exclusively to that portion of Buckley v. Valeo2
discussing contribution and expenditure limits. Although the notes following
the case are good, perhaps of greatest use are the notes Lowenstein inserts
through editor's footnotes within the opinion itself. For example, the reader
gets to considerJudgeJ. Skelly Wright's criticism of Buckley's speech/conduct
analysis at precisely the point the Court makes the argument. '"
The next three chapters explore Supreme Court campaign finance jurisprudence since Buckley. Through the three chapters, we watch the pendulum
swing from the anti-reform Bellotti"' and Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley'5 to the pro-reform MassachusettsCitizensforLifed6 and Austin, 7 in which
the Court appeared to accept for the first time an equalization rationale for
campaign finance reform.
Before approaching public financing and other proposals for campaign
finance reform in Chapter 16, Lowenstein takes a detour in Chapter 15 to
explore the question of incumbency. Unfortunately, much of this chapter
seems out of place. Only its last few pages are devoted to the question whether
campaign finance schemes affect the outcome of election races. The bulk of
the chapter explores other issues related to incumbency, especially the debate
over the desirability of term limits. The material is valuable and insightful; it
just should not be sandwiched between major chapters on campaign finance
reform. Perhaps if Lowenstein later separates this material into another chapter (maybe by relocating it near other representation issues in Chapter 1), he

11. Lowenstein, Political Bribery, supra note 1.

12. 424 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1976).
13. P. 511, n.f (discussing j. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85

Yale LJ. 1001, 1007-08 (1976)).
14. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
15. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
16. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
17. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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will include excerpts from U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,8 the major
Supreme Court case from last term declaring unconstitutional state-imposed
term limits on members of Congress. Thornton gets barely a mention in
Chapter 15 (716).
Lowenstein's final chapter explores the role money plays in post-Buckley
American politics, with special attention to "soft money" and PAC contributions. He ends with a discussion of the desirability of various public financing
proposals and a look at some novel constitutional questions arising from
states' experimentation with campaign finance reform in the last few years.
The Virtue of Selfishness and the Virtue of Virtue
Lowenstein has done a tremendous service by compiling a user-friendly,
thoughtful, and relatively comprehensive guide to election law in the United
States. His work could be strengthened even further by expanding the political theories covered in the casebook to include more prominently both civic
republicanism and public choice theory.
Modern civic republicanism traces its roots to James Madison. 9 Civic republicans recognize that, as a positive matter, "elements of pluralism provide a central feature of modem politics."2 But as a normative matter, civic
republicans reject the pluralist bazaar of competing interest groups.2 Civic
republicans place a great emphasis on civic virtue. Suzanna Sherry writes:
"[I] n the republican vision, a primary function of government is to order
values and define virtue, and thereby educate its citizenry to be virtuous." 22 In
Steven G. Gey's words: "Virtue, the republicans argue, is defined by the
political process of dialogue and ultimate agreement over fundamental collective goals and aspirations.1 23 With a focus on deliberation, civic republicanism
is analytically distinct from both pluralism and progressivism.
Public choice theorists present both a positive and a normative view of the
political process. Positive public choice theory applies economists' assumption of rational self-interested behavior to political science issues.2 4 Although
its roots are in classic pluralism, the theory lacks pluralism's rosy, democracyaffirming vision of a relatively benign political marketplace. Instead, interest
groups use their political capital to secure goods from the state, a process
termed "rent seeking,", leading to a decline in overall social wealth. Using
efficiency as a yardstick, normative public choice theory calls for limits on

18. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
19. Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 30 (1985).
20. Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1547 (1988).
21. Sunstein, surranote 19, at 31.
22. Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L.Rev. 543, 552
(1986).
23. The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801, 807 (1993).
24. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 7 (Chicago, 1991).
25. See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, inThe New Palgrave: The World of Economics, eds.John
Eatwell et al., 604 (NewYork, 1991).
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*group political participation. One way to limit groups' participation is to limit
the size of the state, because elected officials inevitably create rents for interest
groups in pursuit of their own reelection. The fewer rents the state can give
away, the greater the social wealth."
Lowenstein cites only a few of the fine scholarly articles exploring election
law issues from the civic republican and public choice perspectives. Hejustifies his focus on progressivism and pluralism on the ground that "these
theories, far more than the currently fashionable academic theories, have
been the prevailing paradigms for most of the participants in the controversies in which this book is concerned" (19).
Although progressivism and pluralism have been the prevailing paradigms,
and for this reason I certainly do not advocate their removal from the casebook, academics have spilled far more ink the past two decades on civic
republicanism and public choice theory. More important, it seems inevitable
that so long as judges are pulled from the ranks of academia, new academic
perspectives will find their way intojudicial opinions.Judge Frank Easterbrook,
27
for example, relied on public choice theory in a recent judicial opinion.
Justice Stephen Breyer has argued against public choice theory in his scholarly
writings, 28 and one commentator views him as having adopted "a neorepublican outlook in which civic-minded public servants act in the public
interest."2" These theories increasingly will find their way into election law
opinions in the years to come.
Civic republicanism makes a brief appearance in the casebook, though not
by name, in the debate over who constitutes the "community" entitled to vote
in particular elections (39, 99). This is the only textual reference in the
casebook to the civic republican writings of Frank Michelman, and the book
fails to cite Cass Sunstein's work even once. Public choice theory fares slightly
better than civic republicanism. Lowenstein devotes a half page in the first
chapter to Olson's "collective action" critique of classic pluralism (18),11 and
he includes a nice discussion of the so-called "paradox of voting," the question
why anyone rationally chooses to vote given free-rider problems (43-45).
Other public choice arguments get a passing mention (e.g., 98, 388-89, 393
n.b), but there is no sustained public choice theme.
26. See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in The Bill of Rights in
the Modern State, eds. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., 56 (Chicago, 1992);Jonathan R. Macey, The
Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L:j. 1673, 1680 (1988).
27.
Because no single person's vote affects the outcome of a plebiscite, the voters
do not invest heavily in information; rational ignorance is the order of the day
....Professional legislators not only have more time to brush up on the facts
but also more reason to do so, because votes in a smaller assembly are more
likely to be dispositive. Of course ... representatives also have more opportunity
to court (and be courted by) special interest groups ....
Marusic Liquors, Inc. v. Daley, 55 F.3d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1995).
28. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 845, 866-67 (1992).
29. Erid. Gouvin, ASquare Peg in aVicious Circle: Stephen Breyer's Optimistic Prescription for
the Regulatory Mess, 32 Harv.J. on Legis. 473, 482 (1995).
30. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
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Both theories could inform debate in all four principal areas of the
casebook's coverage.
Voting and representation. What role should race play in legislative
districting from a civic republican perspective? Who does public
choice theory predict will be the likely winners of districting battles?
Ballot measures. Is there a civic republican tension between fostering
democratic institutions and the often discriminatory results of ballot
races? When will groups engage in rent seeking through ballot measures rather than through the legislature?
Politicalparties. Do strong political parties inhibit reasoned deliberation among representatives? May strong .political parties prevent interest groups' rent seeking?
Campaignfinance.How do civic republicans balance the right to free
expression guaranteed in the First Amendment with the correlation
between effective political speech and wealth? Under positive public
choice theory, is meaningful campaign finance reform possible?
It may be that civic republicans and public choice theorists have not
thought about all of these issues, and a casebook is not the place to tackle
them for the first time. But at least some election law issues have been
considered and should be discussed. For example, both John Rawls and Cass
Sunstein have argued from a republican perspective that the laissez faire
campaign finance regime set forth in Buckley is no more legitimate than the
now-discredited laissez faire economic regime the Supreme Court once approved of in Lochner.3 1 And Jonathan Macey has argued from a normative
public choice perspective against campaign finance reform proposals that
simply give an advantage to groups that can organize better over groups that
raise more money. 32 To the extent Lowenstein can identify civic republican
and public choice arguments on election law topics, he should include them
in a revised edition of the casebook. Though this will make the already long
book even longer, it will also make the already strong book even stronger.

31. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 362 (NewYork, 1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in
The Bill of Rights in the Modem State, supranote 26, at 291.
32. Macey, supra note 26, at 1680 n.38.

Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Pp. xix + 241.
Reviewed by Michael H. Hoeflich
The study and teaching of Roman law in the United States has always
proceeded by fits and starts. One continuing characteristic, however, has been
the importance of foreign-born scholars who either have trained American
disciples or have emigrated to the United States. The first teacher of Roman
law at Harvard was a German, Charles Follen. Hugh Swinton Legare, the best
of the Southern antebellum Romanists, was trained at Edinburgh. Roscoe
Pound was Germanized through and through. After the Second World War,
Roman law studies (and a good deal else) were re-energized in the U.S. by
6migrds like David Daube, Stefan Kuttner, and Ernst Levy. The past dozen
years have been another period of re-energization in American Roman law
studies, brought about, in large part, by Alan Watson's move from Scotland to
the United States, first at the University of Pennsylvania and now at the
University of Georgia.
Watson is, without question, one of the greatest living expositors of Roman
law in the English-speaking world. One of his colleagues once commented
that he was probably the greatest interpreter of Roman law since the medieval
jurist Imerius lectured at Bologna. Watson made his scholarly reputation with
a series of technical monographs on Republican Roman law. This series
would, for the normal scholar, have been a life's work. For Watson, it was just
a beginning. In more than two dozen books Watson has traced the evolution
of Roman legal ideas from the Twelve Tables to the modem day. In addition,
he put together an international team of translators who produced the first
decent English translation ofJustinian's Digest, the most important source for
Roman juristic thought. Now he has assumed the editorship of a new series to
be published in honor of the anniversary of Montesquieu's life and work and
has himself written the first volume, entitled simply The Spirit of Roman Law.
This new volume from Watson is a triumph on several levels. First, and
foremost, it is a summation of his thinking about Roman law and the more
general topics of law-making and the transmission of legal ideas begun in such
works as his The Making of the Civil Law and Failuresof the LegalImagination.In
this volume. Watson brings together, in the context of his analysis of the
essence of Roman law, his various theories on the structure and function of
legal systems, the ways in which laws are borrowed, adopted, and adapted from
one system to another, the development of legal categories in legal systems,
and the importance of private jurists as opposed to public legislators in the
civil law tradition. On a second level the book is a masterpiece of synthesis, as
Michael H. Hoeflich is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Kansas.
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well, for in it Watson takes the best of his own and other scholars' research to
explain the particular characteristics that have made the Roman legal system
vibrant for more than two millennia. In a series of chapters he explores such
fundamental concepts as the interaction of private law and religion, the
distinction between private and public law, the unique role of Romanjurists in
the development of Roman law, and the concept, which Watson himself has
developed in a number of books, of the "isolation" of Roman law as a creation
of an intellectual elite concerned more with the abstractions of Greek philosophy than the day-to-day policing of the city.
This new volume will delight already addicted Watsonians as well as provide
a simple and clear introduction to both Roman law and Watson's theories of
Roman law and legal history. It is replete with quotations from Roman texts in
clear translation which will introduce a whole new generation, who lack the
Latin necessary to read the originals, to Roman legal thinking. But it is not a
book designed for beginners alone. On the contrary, it provides both an
introduction and an overview but also contains enough sophisticated analysis
to please and provoke specialists. Watson's discussions of the role of thejurists
in law-making and of the indirect influence of religion and of the Roman
pontiffs on legal development at Rome will be sure to evoke comment from
experienced Roman lawyers. In this volume Watson has taken the opportunity
to restate many of the themes developed in his earlier works and to show the
connections between these various themes. In some respects, in fact, this
volume may be seen as a summing up of Watson's research and writing of the
past several decades. In short, this is a book which has much to offer both to
the beginner and to the expert. As such it does well the job of imparting a
sense of the "spirit" of Roman law to all readers regardless of their experience
or expertise.
It is also useful to say what this book is not. First of all, it is not a substitute
for Watson's earlier works. While it does provide a general introduction to
Watson's thought, the serious scholar must consult his earlier monographs to
see the full detail of the careful scholarship that underlies much of the text
here. Second, while this is a book designed to give an overview of the "spirit" of
Roman law, it is not a basic introductory text on the model of works by
scholars such as Barry Nicholas or R. W. Lee. It would'not be a good choice for
a traditional course on the substantive rules of classical Roman law. Its scope
and its vision are far too broad for so narrow a purpose. On the contrary, this
volume of Watson's is a perfect companion for courses on comparative law or
for surveys of Western legal thought; indeed, it would fit well into more
historically inclined courses on Western jurisprudence.
In conclusion, this is a masterful work by a modem master of Roman law
and its tradition in the West. It will stand for years as the best exposition in
English of this subject and will prove useful to law teachers in a variety of
courses. It is also a fitting introduction to an important new series with future
volumes by such notable scholars as R. H. Helmholz and A. W. B. Simpson.
Romanists, legal historians, and comparatists owe the University of Georgia
Press a debt of thanks. In addition to the excellence of the substance, the book
is delightful to hold and to read. Its cover art and typography are first-rate.

EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Evidentiay Distinctions: Understandingthe FederalRules
of Evidence. Charlottesville: Michie Company, 1993. Pp. xxix + 203.
Arthur Best, Evidence: Examples and Explanations. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1994. Pp. xv + 265.
Reviewed by Calvin William Sharpe
In an era of rigorous inquiry into effective pedagogy and heightened
awareness of teaching and learning theory, it is quite appropriate to address
the quality of analytical study aids in specific subjects. The primary educational tools for teaching the law of evidence are the casebook and a rules
supplement, materials that focus the day-to-day classroom treatment of the
rules of evidence. Like other areas of the law, the evidence field abounds with
supplementary materials designed to facilitate the understanding of complex
legal issues. In addition to treatises, nutshells, and hornbooks, there are
outlines, CALI exercises, and other learning aids. Two intriguing recent
additions to this body of work are Edward J. Imwinkwelried's Evidentiay
Distinctions: Understandingthe FederalRules of Evidence and Arthur Best's Evidence: Examples and Explanations.
Imwinkelried, a highly regarded evidence teacher and scholar, has written
on a wide range of evidence topics.2 He has also published teaching materials
and an article on evidence pedagogy.3 It is not surprising that he has written a
book to bring greater clarity to law students struggling to consolidate evidence
materials for the first time. Indeed, Imwinkelried is straightforward in declaring the book's purpose as furnishing an aid in outlining. He says that it is to be
read immediately before outlining to enhance the use of evidentiary distinctions in the outline and on the final examination. The book is likely to be
quite helpful as a learning aid, if used properly.
Calvin William Sharpe is Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University and Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Law at DePaul University.
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See Arturo L. Torres & Karen E. Harwood, Moving Beyond Langdell: An Annotated Bibliography of Current Methods for Law Teaching, Gonzaga L. Rev., at 1 (special ed. 1994); Paul T.
Wangerin, Teachingand Learning in Law School: An "Alternative" Bookshelf for Law School
Teachers, Gonzaga L. Rev., at 49 (special ed. 1994).

2.

See, e.g., The Methods of Attacking Scientific Evidence, 2d ed. (Charlottesville, 1992);
Exculpatory Evidence: The Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Favorable Evidence
(Charlottesville, 1990); Uncharged Misconduct Evidence (Wilmette, 1984); see also An
Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis,
the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 511 (1994); The
Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1148 (1993).
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Materials for the Study of Evidence: Cases and Materials, 2d ed. (Charlottesville, 1986) (with
Ronald L. Carlson); Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of Statutes, 41J. Legal Educ. 227 (1991).
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Imwinkelried puts to work the concept of legal distinctions to sharpen the
focus of students on the Federal Rules of Evidence. He acknowledges the
rules' centrality to evidence courses by organizing EvidentiaryDistinctionsinto
chapters that track the articles of the Federal Rules, but he concentrates on
the most important distinctions in the field, omitting several rules entirely and
omitting phrases and subparagraphs in many others. In selecting the appropriate distinctions for discussion, he4 accurately targets much of the misunderstanding among evidence students.
The book's greatest utility lies in focusing on distinctions that are elliptical
in the rules but important to their operation, as well as distinctions that are
explicitly set forth in the rules. An example is Imwinkelried's discussion in
Chapter 2 of the judicial notice distinctions. Rule 201 (a) states that the rule
"governs onlyjudicial notice of adjudicative facts" and. then sets forth in later
subparagraphs the kinds of facts that are noticeable, the judge's discretion,
opportunity for a hearing, the timing of notice, andjury instructions. Of these
matters, Imwinkelried addresses only noticeable facts, hearing opportunity,
and jury instructions. To flesh out the distinctions that are important to an
understanding of the judicial notice rule, Imwinkelried discusses four distinctions: (1) judicial notice vs. the formal introduction of evidence, (2) judicial
notice of fact vs. judicial notice of law, (3) judicial notice of adjudicative facts
vs. judicial notice of legislative facts, and (4) judicial notice of matters of
common knowledge vs.judicial notice of verifiable certainties (pages 17-21).
Though the Advisory Committee Notes address in detail the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, as well as the reasons for not subjecting legislative facts to the indisputability requirement of Rule 201 (b), the
Notes assume an understanding of distinctions (1), (2), and (4) above.
Imwinkelried's discussion fills the void not only by explaining the other
distinctions that are important to a contextual understanding of Rule 201 but
also by providing examples of each set of distinctions.
Imwinkelried's examples, a major strength of Evidentiary Distinctions, are
5
reminiscent of his influential EvidentiaryFoundations,now in its third edition
Law students and lawyers alike applaud the eminently instructive text on trial
technique designed to give students and novice trial attorneys a "working
understanding" of evidence rules.6 In EvidentiaryDistinctionsthere are equally

4.

Examples are the distinctions between "prejudice in the popular sense and prejudice in the
technical sense" (page 40), character and noncharacter uses of specific acts evidence (5051), balancing tests under Rule 403 and those in 412(c) and 609 (67, 98-99), credibility and
substantive evidence (83-85), the uses of character evidence as proof of credibility and the
merits (90), the use of cross-examination to impeach any witness and to impeach the

character witness (93-94), appropriate subjects of expert testimony (118-19), hearsay and
nonhearsay (129-37), and proof of the contents of a writing and proof of other matters
under the best evidence rule (189-91).
5.

Charlottesville, 1995.

6.

In EvidenliaryFoundatiorslmwinkelried typically divides his discussions of evidence rules into
three sections: (1) The Doctrine, (2) The Elements of the Foundation, and (3) Sample

Foundations. This schematic creates a smooth flow from the abstract to the concrete, giving
readers both a better understanding of doctrine and a model for applying the rules in a trial
setting.
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useful examples like the jury instruction given for presumptions as distinguished from permissive inferences (27), character and noncharacter uses of
specific acts evidence (50-53), statements of admission and compromise
under Rule 408 (59-60), the use of character evidence, religious affiliation,
and prior inconsistent statements for impeachment (91-92, 93-94, 99-100,
107-08), varieties of leading questions (102), the bases for expert opinion
(122-24), and hearsay and nonhearsay statements (129-37). In virtually every
illustration of limited admissibility such as the relevance rules and impeachment and hearsay rules (52, 58, 63, 67, 84, 134), Imwinkelried demonstrates
the links between alternative theories of admissibility, the limiting instruction,
and closing argument. This is a strategic chain that the well-schooled student
of evidence must appreciate.
Imwinkelried's commonsense tone, aided by his deft use of evidence policy
to explain distinctions, contributes to understanding. Learning theorists point
out that learning is contextual: it is more durable when grounded in a network
of other associations. 7 Policy provides that network-the reasons for evidentiary distinctions, which facilitate understanding and memory. The discussion
of evidentiary distinctions with the policy reasons removes the mystery of the
rules, making them accessible to any student with common sense.
Not stopping with verbal elucidation, Evidentiay Distinctions contains figures that summarize the discussion succinctly and graphically, depicting the
vertical and horizontal relationships among distinctions.' Not surprisingly,
more than half of the figures are included in the chapter on relevancy, the
foundation of the law of evidence.
The considerable strengths of this work overshadow isolated weaknesses
relating to coverage and language. For example, Imwinkelried's judgments
about which provisions should be discussed and which omitted are clearly
understandable in practically all instances, but his omission of a section on the
coconspirator admission is inexplicable. The overall approach seems to lend
itself to a discussion of the business partnership admission, not addressed in
801(d) (2) (E), as distinguished from the coconspirator (criminal partnership) admission contained in that section. Moreover, the coconspirator statement as vicarious admission (141) would seem to warrant the same contrast
with the authorized admission (801(d) (2) (C)) that Imwinkelried gives the
agency admission under 801(d) (2) (D). A similar question might be raised
about the omission of the circumstantial authentication illustration at Rule
901(b) (4). Rule 901 (b) contains four examples of direct authentication and
five examples of circumstantial authentication or identification. For instance,
one can directly identify a telephone caller as set forth in 901 (b) (5) or

7.

See Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational Stream to
Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 667, 682-85 (1994); Anthony A.
D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37.1.
Legal Educ. 461, 461-67 (1987).

8.

Regarding the differences in learning styles and the effectiveness of matching styles with
instructional models see Charles S. Claxton & Patricia H. Murrell, Learning Styles: Implications for Improving Educational Practices (College Station, 1987).
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circumstantially by showing that the caller conveyed information likely to be
known only by a particular person. Despite the terms of the provision, students often have some difficulty grasping the illustrative purpose of 901 (b)
and the open-ended possibilities of authenticating evidence. A focus on the
distinction between direct and circumstantial authentication might help to
drive home both points.
Although in general Imwinkelried treats his subject in a straightforwardly
accessible fashion, he occasionally uses stilted language that might be distracting to studentsY For example, he repeatedly uses the term "historical merits"
to refer to factual findings or ultimate facts. Not until close to the end of the
book (191) does he define the term with two examples.10
These quibbles pale in comparison to the usefulness of the book, It should
be recommended as a student study aid, if used properly. But what is proper use?
Citing Marvin Minsky's work," Anthony D'Amato describes effective legal
education as a process that helps students create new problem-solving pathways and overcome mental obstacles to such creativity.12 Recognizing that this
process involves mental struggle, D'Amato decries the spoon-feeding of law
students as counterproductive to the goal of legal education. Not surprisingly,
his observations have implications not only for the style and substance of
classroom instruction but also for teaching materials. D'Amato prefers the
older casebooks as more effective in helping students to develop new mental pathways:
But casebooks have evolved along the lines of becoming easier and easier for
the students to read and digest. The old casebooks challenged the student to
think, to figure out why the cases were placed in that order, and what the
relationships were, if any, among a case and the ones3preceding and following
it. The new casebooks tell the student these things.
If D'Amato is correct in his view that teaching materials forcing a student to
grapple with legal issues are more sound pedagogically, a study aid such as
Evidentiary Distinctionsmust be properly used to avoid impeding intellectual
development. Imwinkelried says in his Introduction that the book should be
used "as an aid in outlining" and recommends that it be readjust before the
student prepares an Evidence outline. But outlining probably has its greatest
9.

This is an anomaly for Imwinkelried, who is a proponent generally of a plain English

approach to evidentiary issues. See Imwinkelried, supranote 5, at 3.
10. In Figure 4 the author isolates the ultimate facts of consequence "on the historical merits"
rather than simply "in the case" (34). Other examples of this quirk are the use of "actus reus"
in place of "act" (34), "terminological consequence" rather than more straightforward
language (138), and "percipient witness" rather than a "witness who perceived" (144). By
contrast Imwinkelried's use of the term "linchpin" fact (108-09) in his discussion of collateral inconsistencies may be unfamiliar to students upon first encounter, but his explanation
and example both clarify the term and convert it into a mnemonic facilitating longer-term
memory.
II. See The Society of Mind (New York, 1986).
12. D'Anato, supranote 7, at 463-64.
at 485.
13. Id.
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educational value as an opportunity for students to synthesize the vast amount
of evidence materials that they have analyzed over the semester. It is a challenge that should enhance problem-solving capacity, if it is not unduly facilitated. This view suggests that the best time for reading EvidentiaryDistinctionsis
after the outlining. At this juncture the book will provide feedback either
reinforcing or correcting students' learning. Alternatively, the book could
prove useful to students at a much earlier stage of initially understanding and
applying the rules. 4 This latter use would be most beneficial to the student
who refers to the book only after strenuous independent efforts to understand
5

the rule. '

Arthur Best's Evidence: Examples and Explanations engages students at a
different level of the learning pyramid. In contrast to the "passive and spoonfed learning" that may characterize the use of commercial outlines,'"3 Best sets
out to engage students in an active process of solving problems that arise
students advance
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Doing problems helps
7
up the pyramid of learning to application and analysis.'
Like Imwinkelried, Best organizes his book around the Federal Rules.
Unlike Imwinkelried, Best proceeds conceptually rather than sequentially. He
begins with the foundational concept in evidence law-relevance (1-52). He
then moves to other issues of admissibility relating to the reliability, form,
disclosure, and proof of relevant evidence such as hearsay (53-123), examination and impeachment (125-56), expert testimony (157-67), privileges (16987), authentication and the original writing rule (189-200), presumptions
(201-07), andjudicial notice (209-12). An appendix contains the text of the
Federal Rules with explanations of most provisions and citations to pages of
the book containing related examples and explanations (213-60).
A major strength of Best's book is that the problems and explanations are
written in plain English, enabling students to achieve comprehension of the
rules and their application without the distraction of jargon. Often in the
evidentiary appendix Best offers a simplified restatement of the rule (219) or
examples of situations falling into categories created by the rule (217).
Most important, the book gives students the opportunity to hit the tennis
ball many times.' A section typically begins with a statement of the rule
14. See I Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals (Cognitive Domain), eds. Benjamin S. Bloom et al. (New York, 1956); 1 Michael S. Josephson,
Learning and Evaluation in Law School 53-101 (Washington, 1984).
15. See D'Amato, .vufranote 8, at 461-67; see also Daniel Pink, Law School Lite, Wash. Monthly,
Nov. 1989, at 20 (noting the irony of negating a $20,000-per-year legal education by "regular
use and dependence" upon a $12 comm'ercial summary and recognizing that such outlines
may be useful for hard-working and conscientious students in some situations).
16. See Pink, spranote 15, at 22 (quoting Dean Colin Diver of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School).
17. See 1 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, suffra note 14; see also Myron Moskovitz, Beyond
the Case Method: It's Time tO Teach with Problems, 42J. Legal Educ. 241, 247 (1992) (on
problem-based learning in higher education).
18. This apt description of learning by the problem method is contained in Roach, supmr note 7,
at 690 (discussing Moskovitz, suf a note 17, at 259, on testing law students).

Book Reviews
followed by a discussion of the rationale and limitations of the rule and the
way it operates. This block-indented discussion is usually followed by more
detailed discussion of the rationale for the rule and of its troublesome aspects,
a discussion often illuminated by charts and diagrams. Examples are the chart
comparing the admissibility of settlements, payments, or pleas and related
statements under Rules 408, 409, and 410 (24), the chart showing alternative
inferences to be drawn from the use of character evidence (31-33), the chart
describing the public records exception to the hearsay rule (104), and the
diagram showing hearsay analysis (63).
Best's hearsay discussion is typical. First, he introduces the discussion in a
way designed to remove the rule's intimidating aspects; he says, "The myth of
hearsay is that no one understands it" (53). He follows this successful effort
with a quotation of the basic rules-801 and 802-and four straightforward
paragraphs explaining the basic operation of the rule (53-55). He then uses a
clear example to explain the rationale of the rule (55-57). A similar discussion of nonhearsay statements is followed by sections on visual aids to understanding the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay statements, the
subtleties of analyzing statements, and recurring fact patterns that he calls
classic hearsay puzzles (66-71).19
The introductory discussion, whose length depends upon the complexity
of the rule, is followed by a number of problems and corresponding explanations. Typically the examples involve a party's attempt to introduce a single
item of evidence at trial under an articulated theory of admissibility. The
explanation usually begins with a ruling on the admissibility issue and a
discussion of the reason for the ruling that reinforces the introductory exposition of the rule and its rationale.
Paradoxically, if the book has a weakness, that weakness may inhere in its
very strength. It is not clear that so much repetition of basic concepts is
necessary for the average law student. Concepts are first explained in a
general introduction, followed by a more detailed treatment of specific elements of the general themes. Yet another iteration ensues (after problemsolving) in the explanations section, and a final tap occurs in the appendix.
Some impatient students may view this amount of repetition as excessive. But
the book will never be faulted for underreinforcing evidentiary principles.'
Students will make best use of this book if they resist the temptation to read
the explanations before independently tackling the examples. If they work
through the problems, repeatedly referring, if necessary, to the introductory
discussion before reading the explanations, their knowledge, comprehension,
application, and analytical skills are certain to improve. The benefits of such

19. Because Best discusses the entire area of examination and impeachment of witnesses in
Chapter 5 before turning to examples and explanations, that section contains the highest
number of problems-21-and explanations. By contrast, the hearsay chapter is divided into
three sections with a total of 34 (7-17-10) examples and explanations.
20. See Roach, suflranote 7, at 670-79, regarding the learning problems associated with student
isolation in law school.
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an active approach to helping students learn seem particularly appropriate in
this area, where the trial setting may require the quick recognition and
resolution of evidentiary issues.

